Nasim Zehra
THE last round of the fourth composite dialogue has ended on a high note. In engaging Pakistan's new government the Indian delegation found that there is more continuity than change in the newly elected government's India policy.
This would be in contrast with the sea change that occurred in Indian policy towards an Indo-US nuclear deal after the Congress took over.
The BJP having laid the foundation for the Indo-US nuclear deal but then also having lost the elections to the Congress and its allies, began politically lynching Congress for carrying forward the nuclear deal policy the BJP itself had authored!
Even on India's Pakistan policy, the BJP has been tough on Congress which has not been as bold as the BJP in its Pakistan policy. The continuity in Islamabad's policy flows from a strategic consensus in Pakistan that dispute resolution and genuine cooperation with India is in Pakistan's own interest.
Other than an overall review of the current state of bilateral
relations the two interlocutors agreed to give counsellor access to Indian and Pakistani citizens taken in the other's country. Easing visa regime was discussed and also the need to improve the conditions for bilateral trade was discussed. Interestingly cement now constitutes a significant Pakistani export to India.
With several million tons of cement shortage projected over the next decade India is now a keen buyer of Pakistani cement. Currently 15 Pakistani cement companies are registered with Indian authorities as exporters. Fauji Cement
interestingly is one of the three Pakistani companies that are regularly exporting cement to India.
The fact that its ownership lies with Fauji Foundation prompted the wise quip from an active participant of the bilateral dialogue "see how times have changed; now it's the Pakistan army that is helping build India!"
To facilitate cement import Indians are seeking improvement in Pakistan-India rail links so as to import cement through rail and not road. Currently, cement tracks are parked at the Lahore border in the no-man's land and hundreds of tons of cement is transferred by labourers into Indian trucks.
Trade between Pakistan and India is on the increase. Official figure this year may cross the 1.5 billion dollar mark. There is a new look and some new substance to the Pakistan-Indian relations. With Delhi and Islamabad having tried wars, mini-wars, subversion, advocating international intervention, the two has concluded dialogue to be the most feasible route for conflict avoidance and dispute resolution. Having experienced the heavy costs of confrontation Pakistan and India are on an irreversible path towards non-confrontation.
While those state institutions in the two countries that are equipped and trained to use sabotage as a policy tool must still at opportune moments attempt subversion against the 'adversary,' the main thrust of overt policy that flows from major policy-making and policy implementation institutions including security institutions is non-confrontation. The signs are plenty. For example contrary to past practice, after the recent tragic blasts in the Indian city of Jaipur, Delhi refrained from promptly blaming Pakistan.
Similarly, according to Delhi's claims skirmishes along the LoC took place and left one Indian dead. To discuss this a flag meeting of Pakistan-Indian military representatives has been requested by the Indians.
The context and the content of this relationship are two separate elements. The extent to which outstanding bilateral disputes and the crucial trilateral dispute Jammu and Kashmir, which heavily contribute towards the context of the relationship mark zero progress towards resolution, the relationship context will be a deterrent towards complete normalisation. The content of Pakistan-India ties will remain limited.
Against the backdrop of sixty years of active hostility that followed the creation of the two states, the prevailing subtext of distrust and cunning, is not surprising. Only the causes of this subtext have to be addressed. There is no inevitability about the end to this sub-text which acts as a major constraining factor in the relations. Distrust and cunning do not simply evaporate. These must be pushed out by the force of more a more positive dynamic that only greater bilateral engagement and enhanced effort at dispute resolution may unleash.
On dispute resolution only minimal progress has been made. Third party i.e. World Bank intervention has helped initial resolution of the Baghliar dam. Meanwhile close naval cooperation, involving the personnel of the two navies travelling on each other's naval vessels, has helped to complete a mutual acceptable Sir Creek survey. Not much beyond this has been achieved.
The inability of the two countries to solve the Siachin dispute is a case in point. Almost twenty years ago an amicable settlement, documented in the form of a draft statement, was arrived at between the defence secretaries of the two countries. Siachin dispute sprung up after Delhi sent its troops to occupy a hitherto unoccupied portion of the glacier on the claim that Pakistani troops were about to occupy it.
Indian politics and specifically Rajiv Gandhi's political compulsions, as he shared them with the then Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, prevented the finalisation of the settlement agreement. Subsequently, Kargil, Pakistan's blundering response to Siachin drove a wedge between the two security forces. Mutual distrust deepened.
In 2004 the Vajpayee- Musharraf led breakthrough led to the revival of the composite dialogue. It had raised hopes for an early settlement of Siachin. Almost half a decade later Siachin seems to have slipped in cold storage. Pakistan's response to India's demand that the presence of its troops be authenticated at the point of 1983 Indian occupation has been reasonable. In the troop withdrawal timetable the Indian troop presence will be shown at the point of occupation.
But post Kargil India seems to need a guarantee that a Kargil type adventure will not be repeated by Pakistan.
How can this be guaranteed? Can it be? First distrust within the two security establishments, borne off the wars and mini-wars, is mutual. Second distrust will deplete if best possible moves for dispute settlement are made. While the concerns of the Indian army which illegally occupies Siachin and initially suffered a disastrous setback in Kargil, must be factored in by Delhi, its views cannot trump all else.
The stalling on Siachin dispute illustrates the indispensable factor i.e. top leadership's commitment, for genuine Pakistan-India peace and cooperation. While technical elements details including legality, security considerations and historical are relevant in dispute resolution the Pakistan-India experience reiterates the known fact that all of these are ultimately vulnerable to subjective interpretation.
Ultimately what interpretation is accepted depends on what the top political leadership seeks through bilateral dialogue.
For example it took the far-sightedness of the Vajpayee's leadership to agree on cross LoC movement minus the passport — a demand that a section of Indian bureaucrats consistently made. Similarly in Pakistan then General Parvez Musharraf supported the cross LoC movement despite majors reservations among bureaucrats.
In Pakistan the procrastination on Siachin can be interpreted as either Delhi's proclivity for the 'jungle rule' — the strong will have his way or that control amounts to near ownership!
Unless India's political leadership, like its predecessor, leads India towards dispute resolution, the benefits of non-confrontation will remain restricted. Some of the other areas in which progress has been inexcusably slow has been the opening up of banks on the basis of reciprocity.
On the crucial trilateral issue of Kashmir three specific factors have yet to be dealt with. First, the implementation of the bilateral agreement on cross-LoC movement of people and goods. Hardly any goods move across the LoC and the long drawn out clearance procedures make peoples' movement very slow. Second some movement on the Musharraf proposals calling for self-governance and joint management as an interim settlement, which was bilaterally agreed upon, must take place with Kashmiri consent.
Third and the most crucial, there is still no framework drawn up within which Pakistan, India and the Kashmiris on both sides of the LoC can participate in a political dialogue aimed at working towards a solution acceptable to the principal party to the dispute i.e. the Kashmiris. The APHC and the Hizbul Mujahideen still remain excluded from any solution-seeking effort.
On the ground, the Western and Indian media reports on Jammu and Kashmir continue to document human rights violations by Indian security forces, the missing persons and unnamed graves of thousands of unknowns, increase in deployment of Border Security Forces, increase in militant activity, boycott of the September polls by the APHC, skirmishes along the LoC etc.
None of this is reason for complacency for Delhi or for Islamabad and for indeed the Kashmiris; it spells continued suffering and absence of peace and security. Immediate movement on some aspects of the Kashmir dispute is needed to make all three parties have a stake in the dialogue process.
Clearly, for the fifth dialogue, that the two governments are likely to begin in Delhi in June, to be more productive, there needs to be more focus on dispute settlement. Progress on other elements of the context including a more lenient visa regime and easier information exchange is also essential and perhaps likely.
Nasim Zehra is a fellow of Harvard University Asia Center, Cambridge, Mass. and Adjunct professor at SAIS Johns Hopkins University, Washington DC.
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