Nasim Zehra
The PPP co-chairman's statement calling up the controversially-elected president general Pervez Musharraf to resign surprised many. Especially for those including other political parties, who believed that there was mere shadow boxing going on between Musharraf and the PPP, this seemingly straight talk regarding the PPP's position, was particularly surprised. Many welcomed it.
The PPP co-chairman subsequently followed up with other similar assertions in various interviews — "the PPP does not accept the president as a constitutionally elected president," "our government only has a working relationship with the president," " the public pressure to remove the president is growing," "he would not meet the president until the people would want him to meet the president" and so on.
Behind the scenes much else went on. The president was conveyed the PPP's intentions to remove 58(2)b and also the constitutional clauses to take away the President's powers to appoint services chiefs and the Governors. The Islamabad-based American officials too figured in the discussions. The president was not agreeable to the removal of these clauses. There were visits between the presidency and those involved in these discussions. However, no formal PPP party ticket holder visited the presidency. The president's public retort was that he is a constitutionally elected president and, when it occurs, his departure must be honourable and dignified.
Like much else on the political front, the Islamabad-based Americans have attempted to see these discussions through amicably. Given the US role in Pakistan's post March 2007 political crisis with General Musharraf as its central figure, the ruling coalition has been okay with the American role in the post- election power struggle in Pakistan. In the case of General Musharraf particularly Washington has been an arbiter on his behalf with all political parties. For the PPP too Washington played the role of an arbiter with General Musharraf.
However, had it not been for the March 9 2007 peoples' movement calling for Constitutional democracy, Musharraf would neither have given PPP the opening to return nor would Washington have pushed so hard that Musharraf reverse his November 3 imposition of martial law.
For Washington, General Musharraf's primary worth lay in what they believed was his able support for their war on terrorism. By contrast in Pakistan against the backdrop of growing discontent against lawlessness of the powerful and their trashing of the Constitution, General Musharraf's positive contributions faded in the peoples' minds who took to the streets.
Increasingly, for those who occupied public space, for those who participated in street protests, Musharraf was the violator of law, the man who exercised power and State authority at will. Many argued he must go.
The post-election developments raised many questions regarding Musharraf's future. What many believed was fait accompli did not happen. Instead of general Musharraf's departure, especially post-government formation it seemed he may survive. The PPP cabinet opted for decent engagement with the presidency. A calm had just begun to settle despite of course the complete rejection of the president by the country's second largest political party and also the member of the ruling coalition.
A low-level power struggle too continued as the presidency began to provide political oxygen to the defeated and increasingly divided PML-Q. However the national attention was focused on the question of the judges' restoration. The ideal scenario should have been for the coalition government to come and resolve the one issue that would have substantially served as a deterrent for future martial laws and indeed a deterrent for unconstitutional ways of elected governments too- the restoration of the judiciary.
The restoration would have generated trust and goodwill
all around including among the ranks of the elected forces and the
people of Pakistan. The power struggle facilitated by the presidency
would have also somewhat subsided. It would have freed the coalition government's mental and political energy to focus largely on the issues that are creating hell for the people — electricity shortage,
crushing inflation and shortage of flour.
The restoration question has not only not been tackled, it has been
further complicated. Now it seems to have become apart of the 62- point constitutional package to be tabled in the National Assembly.
Paradoxically, the unresolved judicial question has led to another
fresh round of 'go Musharraf go' chant. This time it includes Zardari too. And what do we see on the sidelines of parliamentary activity?
We see the reinvigorated enthusiastic connection between the presidency and the PML-Q. After having tried repeatedly yet unsuccessfully, to oust the Chaudaries and get a leader "acceptable to Zardari," the president seems to be falling back on the PML-Q. Reportedly, the Chaudaries are back as visitors of the Camp office.
To a great extent the Presidency can fairly be marked as
contributing source to political instability, political intrigue and
political confusion. Key moves that cause instability, intrigue and
confusion can be traced to the presidency, admittedly though not
without some civilian partnership. The country is now in the midst of a three dimension political volatility.
One is the power struggle which involves the president and the parliament. Musharraf seeks parliamentary support to defeat any motion to clip his constitutional powers. Two is the struggle to restore the judiciary. This struggle remains unabated since November 3 imposition of a mini-martial law and the sacking of the judiciary. Unless this issue is not resolved justly no government will be able to function normally.
Three, the latest is the 62-point political package. While its passage may not be possible for months it will generate much debate and merely generate additional political nervousness without resolving any of the outstanding political issues.
Significantly, the 62-point package presented by the PPP in consultation with its minor coalition partner the ANP, raises many questions. Will it resolve the question of the president future? No. Will it deal with clipping the presidential powers within the immediate context? No. Will it resolve the restoration of the judges? No.
Will it contribute towards creating political stability within the immediate context? No. Clearly a 62-point Constitutional package will take at least a year plus for passage. Both the required time for parliamentary discussion and debate and for the entire process of the elements of the package going to various Standing Committees would take a long time. If there is some other speedy fast-track process that the ruling coalition may have worked out, then we shall soon know about it. That however seems unlikely.
So ultimately where we stand today is a national political context which is somewhat wobbly and uncertain. It generates panic especially among the investors, it is hitting hard at an inherited economy which has already troubled and the final target of all this are the suffering Pakistanis.
The only way to arrest this continuing political stability is for the leaders of the ruling coalition to decide on the future of the president and on the best way to resolve the judicial crisis. Divided opinion and inaction on these two issues will mean continuing political instability and also worsening of the economic crisis. Quick and wise decision is a must. Pakistan and its people cannot afford indecision or intrigues against democracy by the elected representatives anymore.
Nasim Zehra is a fellow of Harvard University Asia Center, Cambridge, Mass. and Adjunct professor at SAIS Johns Hopkins University, Washington DC.
The PPP co-chairman's statement calling up the controversially-elected president general Pervez Musharraf to resign surprised many. Especially for those including other political parties, who believed that there was mere shadow boxing going on between Musharraf and the PPP, this seemingly straight talk regarding the PPP's position, was particularly surprised. Many welcomed it.
The PPP co-chairman subsequently followed up with other similar assertions in various interviews — "the PPP does not accept the president as a constitutionally elected president," "our government only has a working relationship with the president," " the public pressure to remove the president is growing," "he would not meet the president until the people would want him to meet the president" and so on.
Behind the scenes much else went on. The president was conveyed the PPP's intentions to remove 58(2)b and also the constitutional clauses to take away the President's powers to appoint services chiefs and the Governors. The Islamabad-based American officials too figured in the discussions. The president was not agreeable to the removal of these clauses. There were visits between the presidency and those involved in these discussions. However, no formal PPP party ticket holder visited the presidency. The president's public retort was that he is a constitutionally elected president and, when it occurs, his departure must be honourable and dignified.
Like much else on the political front, the Islamabad-based Americans have attempted to see these discussions through amicably. Given the US role in Pakistan's post March 2007 political crisis with General Musharraf as its central figure, the ruling coalition has been okay with the American role in the post- election power struggle in Pakistan. In the case of General Musharraf particularly Washington has been an arbiter on his behalf with all political parties. For the PPP too Washington played the role of an arbiter with General Musharraf.
However, had it not been for the March 9 2007 peoples' movement calling for Constitutional democracy, Musharraf would neither have given PPP the opening to return nor would Washington have pushed so hard that Musharraf reverse his November 3 imposition of martial law.
For Washington, General Musharraf's primary worth lay in what they believed was his able support for their war on terrorism. By contrast in Pakistan against the backdrop of growing discontent against lawlessness of the powerful and their trashing of the Constitution, General Musharraf's positive contributions faded in the peoples' minds who took to the streets.
Increasingly, for those who occupied public space, for those who participated in street protests, Musharraf was the violator of law, the man who exercised power and State authority at will. Many argued he must go.
The post-election developments raised many questions regarding Musharraf's future. What many believed was fait accompli did not happen. Instead of general Musharraf's departure, especially post-government formation it seemed he may survive. The PPP cabinet opted for decent engagement with the presidency. A calm had just begun to settle despite of course the complete rejection of the president by the country's second largest political party and also the member of the ruling coalition.
A low-level power struggle too continued as the presidency began to provide political oxygen to the defeated and increasingly divided PML-Q. However the national attention was focused on the question of the judges' restoration. The ideal scenario should have been for the coalition government to come and resolve the one issue that would have substantially served as a deterrent for future martial laws and indeed a deterrent for unconstitutional ways of elected governments too- the restoration of the judiciary.
The restoration would have generated trust and goodwill
all around including among the ranks of the elected forces and the
people of Pakistan. The power struggle facilitated by the presidency
would have also somewhat subsided. It would have freed the coalition government's mental and political energy to focus largely on the issues that are creating hell for the people — electricity shortage,
crushing inflation and shortage of flour.
The restoration question has not only not been tackled, it has been
further complicated. Now it seems to have become apart of the 62- point constitutional package to be tabled in the National Assembly.
Paradoxically, the unresolved judicial question has led to another
fresh round of 'go Musharraf go' chant. This time it includes Zardari too. And what do we see on the sidelines of parliamentary activity?
We see the reinvigorated enthusiastic connection between the presidency and the PML-Q. After having tried repeatedly yet unsuccessfully, to oust the Chaudaries and get a leader "acceptable to Zardari," the president seems to be falling back on the PML-Q. Reportedly, the Chaudaries are back as visitors of the Camp office.
To a great extent the Presidency can fairly be marked as
contributing source to political instability, political intrigue and
political confusion. Key moves that cause instability, intrigue and
confusion can be traced to the presidency, admittedly though not
without some civilian partnership. The country is now in the midst of a three dimension political volatility.
One is the power struggle which involves the president and the parliament. Musharraf seeks parliamentary support to defeat any motion to clip his constitutional powers. Two is the struggle to restore the judiciary. This struggle remains unabated since November 3 imposition of a mini-martial law and the sacking of the judiciary. Unless this issue is not resolved justly no government will be able to function normally.
Three, the latest is the 62-point political package. While its passage may not be possible for months it will generate much debate and merely generate additional political nervousness without resolving any of the outstanding political issues.
Significantly, the 62-point package presented by the PPP in consultation with its minor coalition partner the ANP, raises many questions. Will it resolve the question of the president future? No. Will it deal with clipping the presidential powers within the immediate context? No. Will it resolve the restoration of the judges? No.
Will it contribute towards creating political stability within the immediate context? No. Clearly a 62-point Constitutional package will take at least a year plus for passage. Both the required time for parliamentary discussion and debate and for the entire process of the elements of the package going to various Standing Committees would take a long time. If there is some other speedy fast-track process that the ruling coalition may have worked out, then we shall soon know about it. That however seems unlikely.
So ultimately where we stand today is a national political context which is somewhat wobbly and uncertain. It generates panic especially among the investors, it is hitting hard at an inherited economy which has already troubled and the final target of all this are the suffering Pakistanis.
The only way to arrest this continuing political stability is for the leaders of the ruling coalition to decide on the future of the president and on the best way to resolve the judicial crisis. Divided opinion and inaction on these two issues will mean continuing political instability and also worsening of the economic crisis. Quick and wise decision is a must. Pakistan and its people cannot afford indecision or intrigues against democracy by the elected representatives anymore.
Nasim Zehra is a fellow of Harvard University Asia Center, Cambridge, Mass. and Adjunct professor at SAIS Johns Hopkins University, Washington DC.
Posts
No comments:
Post a Comment