This can’t be happening

Text by:Rabia Akhtar
‘’We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you’re studying that reality — judiciously, as you will — we’ll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that’s how things will sort out. We’re history’s actors . . . and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do.’’ This quote is from an often-repeated New York Times Magazine’s 2004 article in which journalist Ron Suskind described a conversation with an unnamed senior Bush adviser in the year 2002, describing the neo-conservative ‘reality’ as they see it and as how the world shall see it. The time to change this ‘one reality’ imposed upon the world, has arrived. US Department of Defence is once again responsible for shipping in late 2006, a highly sensitive nuclear component used to trigger the detonation of a nuclear warhead to Taiwan ‘mistakenly’ instead of a non-nuclear, non-sensitive order of helicopter batteries that Taiwan had placed in 2005. This is the US version of reality. The case of mistaken identity is only 22 inches long and 8 inches in diameter, abode needle shaped nose cones that fit atop of the nuclear warhead of a Minuteman Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM). Interestingly, the intended shipment was supposed to be 1.2 volt helicopter batteries which would have been housed in a container with a width of 9.5 inches and height of 5 inches. But instead, the actual ‘mis-taken’ shipment was housed in an 18.5 inches wide container with a height of 32.5 inches. Alarm bells should have rung, right? Wrong. The US Defence Logistics Agency (DLA) placed the obviously large containers (the obviously wrong ones) in the unclassified storage house to be shipped later in 2006. This mistake surfaced only last week when after having been in store for almost 18 months or so, it was the Taiwanese that discovered the difference in shape and reported to the US that the received shipment did not look anything like their original order. They went on to indicate that the received device resembled ‘components of a nuclear warhead’. Several observations demand immediate attention. Firstly, it is interesting to note that the classified nuclear components have different Harmonized System (HS) Codes from those of the unclassified and thus it should have been impossible to have erroneously placed the classified containers carrying nuclear components in an unclassified storage house. Any export control declaration will have to have HS code and an export classification number as part of risk profiling by the US Customs. If this was missed or casually set aside, then the US export control officials have some serious explaining to do.Secondly, this piece of mistaken identity, the nose cone fuse for Minuteman missiles, is a highly sensitive and extremely expensive component since it serves as the brain of the re-entry vehicle of an ICBM. This type of technology is not easily achievable and for any low nuclear threshold state, such a component could be of enormous value. Therefore, the sensitivity of the issue cannot be disparaged by stating that it is yet another case of ‘human error’ of shipping ‘non-nuclear component’. Export of this item falls under ‘Components for Nuclear Explosive Devices’ and any such ‘Equipment, Assembly and Components’ are prohibited items in the Nuclear Suppliers Group list, Part 2, Section 6. Therefore, this shipment is a clear violation of export controls given the fact that it falls under the NSG control list. Moreover, this shipment is a gross violation of NPT Article I as well whereby each Nuclear Weapon State (NWS) undertakes not to transfer, to any recipient (Taiwan in this case), nuclear weapons, or other nuclear explosive devices, and not to assist any non-nuclear weapon state to manufacture or acquire such weapons or devices. In this case, devices such as electrical nose-cone fuses for ICBMs were shipped. Besides violating NPT article I and NSG export control list, the US has also violated the guidelines of Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) which is a voluntary regime ‘to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (i.e. nuclear, chemical and biological weapons), by controlling transfers that could make a contribution to delivery systems (other than manned aircraft) for such weapons’. According to MTCR guidelines, Category I items are those of the greatest sensitivity and Item 2, Category I, (b) 3 is ‘electronic equipment specially designed for re-entry vehicles’. And since these nose-cone fuses are electronic equipment especially designed for re-entry vehicles, the US has violated the guidelines of MTCR despite being a founding member state. Furthermore, EU Export Control list, Category 3-Electronics includes control items for systems, equipments and components ranging from item numbers 3A201-3A322. Therefore after analyzing as to how many violations are in order, the US owes some serious explanation to the entire international community who will not accept justification in the name of ‘it is the case of mistaken shipment’. However for the time being while the investigation is ongoing—in the larger interest for world peace—let us exchange more batteries. The writer is a doctoral candidate at QAU, working on nuclear issues. Email: rabiakhter@gmail.com